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INTRODUCTION 
As this lecture also serves as this year’s Annual IP lecture of the Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual 
Property Law (the “Chair”), I have decided to speak 
about an aspect of my role as the Chair — or what has 
occupied a significant amount of my time recently — and 
some of the research I am currently conducting.  As the 
official title of my position as the Chair makes clear, I am 
now principally concerned with intellectual property law. 
This necessarily requires some sought of introduction to 
intellectual property law, sometimes referred to simply 
as “IP law.”  
Being a curious primate, while I was doing my articles 
of clerkship to become an attorney, I asked a partner 
at the particular law firm why he enjoyed insolvency 
practice.  His response, rather surprisingly, was that upon 
insolvency the law is turned on its head.  What he meant 
by that was that insolvency is an event which requires 
one to think differently about particular relationships, 
and that it imposes a new hierarchy of priorities.  I often 
think of that particular characterisation in relation to my 
own chosen field of interest in the law, namely, intellectual 
property law.  While the term “intellectual property 
law” is now commonly encountered, it is frequently 
incorrectly used, and what it protects is misunderstood. 
Moreover, it is the subject of sustained criticism, and 
even treated with hostility, sometimes outright hostility.
Intellectual property law is probably as esoteric an 
area of law as you are likely to encounter.  For example, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, as recently as 2008, still 
described copyright as an “arcane” area of law.1  This is 
not to suggest that it requires any particular aptitude 
which is distinct from that required in the study of other 
areas of law.  As with most other areas of law, it has 
an associated legal jargon: seemingly common terms 
have technical, or specific, meanings.  It is probably no 
surprise that, because of its esoteric nature, it is often 
misunderstood, and maligned.  Of course, its esoteric 
nature also makes it a very interesting field of academic 
enquiry.  It is, thus, necessary for me, as an academic 
specialising in intellectual property law (and certainly as 
the Chair), to fulfil two important roles. 
1 King v SA Weather Service [2009] 2 All SA 31 (SCA) 36.
First, there is the need to educate people concerning 
intellectual property law, and to clarify common 
misconceptions about the law.  The task of educating 
people concerning intellectual property law, almost 
invariably, involves having to explain why we recognise 
intellectual property rights, apart from what it protects. 
My other role is to make a contribution to the scholarship 
in the area of intellectual property law.  In my case, my 
research interests are in the areas of copyright law, trade 
mark law and issues concerning intellectual property law 
generally.  Accordingly, this lecture will reflect these two 
aspects of my role as the Chair.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The very concept of “intellectual property law” is somewhat of a misnomer.  Intellectual property 
law is not a distinct legal concept or a unitary set of 
legal principles, but rather an umbrella, or generic, term 
for distinct types of legal protection.2  In other words, 
intellectual property law is not a homogenous concept, 
but a collection of distinct forms of legal protection.
The most well-known of these forms of protection 
are copyright, trade mark law, patent law and design 
law.  Having said that,  while there may be quite distinct 
justifications for their recognition and associated rights, 
they share important common features.  These forms 
of legal protection concern the products of intellectual 
effort, and the subject matter of the legal protection is of 
an intangible (or incorporeal) nature.
  It is the intangible nature of the subject matter that 
not only provides the reason that these forms of creation 
require legal protection (for example, to incentivise their 
creation), it is also the aspect which tends to present 
problems when seeking to establish the correct legal 
position in a particular set of circumstances.  Although 
intellectual property is often embodied in, or conveyed 
by means of, a physical medium, it is important to note 
that that which intellectual property law protects is 
intangible and distinct from the physical thing. There are, 
thus, almost invariably, at least two sets of legal principles 
which are applicable in a given situation, namely, property 
law (with its foundations in Roman law), which regulates 
the ownership and possession of the physical thing, and 
the relevant intellectual property law.
2 du Plessis E, et al. Adams & Adams: Practitioner’s Guide to Intellectual 
Property Law (2011) 1ed 1; Harms L “The Politics of Intellectual 
Property Laws” 2012 TSAR 3 461 461.
4This distinction between the intangible intellectual 
property and the physical thing in which the intellectual 
property may be incorporated is one that is often 
overlooked, and such oversight can lead to erroneous 
— and potentially embarrassing — conclusions about 
what the legal position is in a given situation.  The legal 
position in relation to the physical item may appear 
to be counter-intuitive because of the application of 
intellectual property law.  For example, intellectual 
property rights may limit what the owner of a physical 
item, which incorporates intellectual property, may be 
able to do with such item.3 
While there may be many reasons why people 
create matter which is protectable by intellectual 
property rights, intellectual property rights allow the 
rights holders to exploit their creations in the manner 
they consider appropriate.  In other words, intellectual 
property rights do not prescribe how a rights holder 
should exploit its rights; it merely provides the rights 
holder with the ability to determine how to exploit its 
property rights.  This is an incredibly powerful device. 
First, the recognition of property rights serves as an 
incentive for marginal innovation, which yields new 
creations.  Second, it presents the relevant rights holder 
with a complete spectrum of choices of how to exploit 
its creation.  For example, the rights holder may choose 
to donate its creation to the public domain or license 
the use thereof on very liberal terms.4
The role of the Chair is, inter alia, to serve as a 
custodian for intellectual property law, ensuring that the 
integrity of its underlying rationale, and principles, are 
maintained and respected.  This is not to suggest that 
intellectual property law is immutable, and is some kind 
of holy cow.  It is constantly evolving, and has developed 
in response to the emergence of new technologies.  For 
example, under copyright law, sound recordings first 
became an eligible category of copyright work under the 
British Copyright Act 1911, and the subsequent British 
Copyright Act 1956 introduced copyright protection for 
cinematograph films, broadcasts and published editions. 5
3 An example of this is the use of copyright law to prevent parallel 
importation of goods. See Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand 
Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 279 (A).
4 The public domain is the material that can be used by any person, 
either because it is not protected intellectual property law (because 
such protection has expired or the material was never protected as 
such) or its use is permissible as an exception to the protection afforded 
(for example, the fair-dealing exceptions, or because the rights holder 
has elected to not enforce any of the rights which it may enjoy).
5 Cornish W Intellectual Property 3ed (1996) 302-3.
These developments were replicated under the South 
African Copyright Act 63 of 1965, as that act expanded 
the categories of copyright work to include sound 
recordings, cinematograph films, broadcasts and published 
editions.6  More recently, relatively speaking, pursuant to 
a 1992 amendment to the Copyright Act 98 of 1978,7 
South Africa started protecting computer programs as a 
sui generis, or distinct, category of copyright work. 
It is not only in relation to new products of creative 
endeavour, or investment, that there has to be periodical 
consideration of a case for possible inclusion in one or 
more of the species of intellectual property law.  It may be 
a case that the existing protection offered to a particular 
type of product may be insufficient to incentivise future 
production and investment, despite there ostensibly 
being a potentially huge market therefor.  There may 
be instances in which an aspect of the market may 
present a challenge which means that the intellectual-
property protection available does not yield the desired 
marginal investment, and the corresponding further 
production.  Put differently, it may be that not even the 
prospect of obtaining intellectual property rights may 
serve as sufficient incentive to encourage certain kinds 
of socially-desirable goods.  So much for the argument 
that the intellectual property rights provide too much 
protection to rights holders.
A curious, and rather serious, instance of such a 
situation is the market for new antibiotics, despite the 
current market being worth approximately US$ 40 
billion.8 Although antibiotics have been amongst the 
most important scientific advances of the past century, 
and have been very effective in treating infections, 
their effectiveness reduces over time due to bacterial 
gene mutations.  Because of this fact, humans become 
resistant to antibiotics over time, which, in turn, requires 
the production of new antibiotics.  While the number 
of people who are resistant to antibiotics at present 
does not constitute a significant enough market for 
the necessary research into new antibiotics, there is a 
looming healthcare issue.9  Furthermore, the prudential 
approach to the prescribing of antibiotics (“or good 
stewardship practice”10), namely, that they should only 
be prescribed as a last resort (due to their reducing 
efficacy),
6 Copeling A Copyright Law in South Africa 1ed (1969) 42-6.
7 Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992, which came into operation 
on 10 July 1992.
8 Rex J H and Outterson K “Antibiotic Reimbursement in a Model 
Delinked from Sales: A Benchmark-based Worldwide Approach” 2016 
The Lancet Infectious Diseases 16 500 503.
9 500. 
10 503.
  
5means that a patentee of a new antibiotic is not likely 
to realise a sufficient return on its investment during its 
period of exclusive rights (namely, the life of the patent). 
It should be borne in mind that a small fraction of 
research investment into new pharmaceuticals translates 
into a successful product, and that there are more 
profitable markets which pharmaceutical companies can 
invest in, such as, chronic medication.11  A number of 
governments are concerned enough to find a solution 
to this problem, and various possibilities are being 
considered, such as, providing direct financial incentives 
to pharmaceutical companies paid for “with proportional 
financial contributions from, at the very least, members 
of the G20”.12  What would South Africa do if called 
upon to make a proportionate contribution? Of course, 
another possible solution may be to increase the term of 
patent protection for antibiotics, given the longer period 
required to realise an economic profit.13
Developments in relation to intellectual property 
law are not confined to increasing protection; the law 
also seeks to strike a balance between the rationale 
for the recognition of those rights and the social costs 
thereof.  For example, there may be situations in which 
intellectual property law may, at a market level, not be 
able to provide the necessary incentives for the creation 
of certain desirable works.  The size of the potential 
market for particular works may, on the basis of realistic 
business forecasts, not be sufficiently attractive for 
possible profitable exploitation.  If that market need 
is sufficiently constrained, so as to not undermine the 
rationale for the particular intellectual property right, 
it provides a good basis for an exception to the rights 
which intellectual property law would otherwise have 
afforded the rights holder.  A good example of this type 
of situation is the need to facilitate access to books 
for blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled 
persons provided by the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (2013).14
11 Katz M L, et al. “Where have all the Antibiotic Patents Gone?” 2006 
Nature Biotechnology 24 (12) 1529 1530.
12 Rex and Outterson 503.
13 Katz, et al. 1531.
14 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=301019 
(accessed 30 August 2017).
Critics of intellectual property law are apt to resort 
to sweeping generalisations about the unacceptable 
social costs of intellectual-property protection.  First, 
as is the case with many issues concerning indigenous 
knowledge, these critics, who seek to undermine the 
property rights established by intellectual property law, 
often resort to making rather emotive, and sensational, 
claims, but find it difficult to substantiate their criticisms 
with good evidence, other than for anecdotal tales. 
Law is a human construct, and, like its creators, it is 
not perfect.  In almost every area of law there may be 
situations which may give rise to a seemingly inequitable 
result; not every grievance or matter of concern means 
that there is a neat, ready-made legal solution, or that 
the law has failed.  While we constantly seek to improve 
the law, it is important to bear in mind that the law has 
to provide general, workable solutions to best regulate 
society.  Law aims to provide the necessary certainty, 
or predictability, by which persons can organise their 
affairs.  In the absence of legal rules, disputes will be 
determined by those who have authority, according to 
their own ethical, or political, preferences.  If there is no 
requirement that disputes be settled according to legal 
rules or principles, there would be no need for lawyers, 
or, indeed, the law.  Disputes would simply settled by 
ethicists, or politicians, most probably, the latter, as they 
would have the authority to impose their will on others. 
Of course, there are those who think that legal doctrine 
is passé, and that we should embrace the postmodernist, 
relativist lottery.  I prefer to think that knowledge of the 
world is possible, and that certain forms of conduct are 
unequivocally unacceptable.
Second, critics of intellectual property fail to realise, 
or acknowledge, that intellectual property law — as 
already indicated — is continually being refined in an 
effort to maintain an appropriate balance.  It is not 
appropriate today to make broad generalisations about 
the social costs of any particular species of intellectual 
property, such as, for example, copyright protection. 
Even within a particular species of intellectual property 
law, the courts, and legislation, have sought to minimise 
the social costs of providing the relevant protection. 
For example, in the case of copyright protection of 
computer programs, there has been recognition of 
the functional nature of computer programs and the 
technical constraints applicable to their creation.  The 
law has recognised that the creation of computer 
programs is more similar to an engineering project than 
artistic creativity.  Progress in such a technical field is 
incremental, and excessive protection would prevent 
such an incremental, cumulative process from being 
6possible.  Given the importance of computer programs 
in almost every facet of modern-day life, it is necessary 
that there should be good substitutable products, and the 
likelihood that they will emerge depends, to some degree, 
on the scope of protection.  Recognition of this context 
has meant that copyright will provide comparatively 
thin protection to computer programs, as this level 
of protection is considered to strike the appropriate 
balance between providing the necessary incentives and 
ensuring that there is a sufficiently large public domain.15 
It is, thus, necessary to be more specific in any criticism 
of intellectual property law.  This, necessarily, requires a 
sound knowledge of the particular aspects of intellectual 
property law in order for there to be a properly informed 
debate about these matters. We need more focused 
scholarship to ensure that the balance is appropriately 
struck. This is the rational process by which specific 
challenges ought to be addressed. There is nothing to 
be gained by appealing to (often sensational) anecdotal 
tales of hardship caused by intellectual property rights, 
and the unjustified clamour for wholesale changes.  It has 
been said that “[f]or every problem there is a solution 
that is simple, direct, and wrong.”16
Emerging technology, and business practices, bring 
with it new challenges to various areas of law.  When that 
happens, the rational response is rarely, if ever, that there 
is no longer any purpose for a particular area of law.  On 
the contrary, new challenges only serve to highlight the 
need to sharpen our legal understanding, and regulation, 
in order to address the particular developments.  For 
example, the emergence of the Uber ride service does 
not render the regulation of transport services in the 
interests of consumers irrelevant.  It asks more searching 
questions about how best to protect consumers, not 
only in relation to issues of personal safety, but also 
the pricing of taxi services.  In a similar vein, the AirBnB 
service does not signal the end of the law concerning 
landlord and tenant, or the regulation of hotel services 
(with its origins in the Roman law relating to innkeepers). 
What it may have brought about is a change in the 
market for rental property, rather than suggest that the 
relevant legal principles are obsolete.  It may also serve 
to indicate that the distinction between rental property 
and hotel accommodation have become blurred.  It may 
be necessary to provide legal regulation to protect the 
market for rental accommodation, by ensuring that there 
is a clearer distinction between rental property and 
hotel accommodation.
15 See Karjiker S “Copyright Protection of Computer Programs” 2016 
SALJ 1 51.
16 McMillan J Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets 
1ed (2002) 13.  This quote is attributed to the American journalist and 
satirist, HL Mencken..
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY
A source of real concern is the apparent lack of understanding of the fundamentals on the part of 
those in government responsible for the maintenance 
of our laws relating to intellectual property law, most 
notably the Department of Trade and Industry.  The 
Department of Trade and Industry (the “DTI”) is 
tasked with matters concerning intellectual property 
law, including the oversight of the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission, which administers 
the registration system relating to registered intellectual 
property.  Examples of the DTI’s inept, and dysfunctional, 
management of intellectual property law are its latest 
draft of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 (the “2017 
Copyright Amendment Bill”),17 and the recent publication 
of the Draft Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of 
South Africa Phase I 2017 (the “2017 Draft IP Policy”).18 
 It is submitted that there is ample evidence to suggest 
that the drafting of the 2017 Copyright Amendment 
Bill was done by persons who do not understand 
the basics of copyright law.  There are even signs that 
those responsible for drafting the proposed legislation 
were unfamiliar with the existing legislation, namely, 
the legislation it seeks to amend.19  But, as the religious 
minister Matthew Henry said in relation to Psalm 58 of 
the Bible, “There’s none as deaf as those who are not 
willing to hear.”
The 2017 Copyright Amendment Bill was the subject 
of public hearings arranged by the Portfolio Committee 
on Trade and Industry (the “Portfolio Committee”) on 
1, 3 and 4 August 2017.  Given my role as the Chair, I 
attended these hearings to raise my concerns about the 
proposed changes, and the lack of expertise evidenced 
by the poor quality of the drafting.  At the hearing I 
presented an excoriating critique on the 2017 Copyright 
Amendment Bill.  Over the three days there were a 
number of other presentations indicating deep concern 
about the unwarranted erosion of property rights. 
To my utter surprise, the very next week a colleague 
at the Law Faculty was contacted by someone in the 
secretariat of the Portfolio Committee, indicating that 
the Portfolio Committee was “considering targeting 
specific people with extensive experience in the various 
affected industries”. 
17 Copyright Amendment Bill, version B 13-2017, published on 16 
May 2017 pursuant to a notice published about a year ago in the 
Government Gazette (Notice 799 of 2017 (GG 40121, 5 July 2016)).
18 Draft Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa 
Phase I 2017, Notice 636 of 2017 (GG 41064, 25 August 2017).
19 Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (“Copyright Act”).  The Chair submitted 
extensive comments on the 2017 Copyright Amendment Bill, which 
can be accessed via the Chair’s website.  See http://blogs.sun.ac.za/
iplaw/files/2017/06/CIP-Comments-Copyright-Amendment-Bill-2017.
pdf. 
7My colleague’s area of specialisation is constitutional law, 
and, to the best of my knowledge, she has never worked 
in any area of intellectual property law.  One gets the 
distinct feeling that the prevailing attitude on the part 
of the DTI is to canvass for opinions which support its 
problematic proposals, because it is not satisfied with 
what it is being told. 
Alternatively, given the degree of opposition to the 
proposed amendments, the DTI may — through some 
form of twisted logic — perceive the opposition as some 
sort of indication, or sign, that its proposals are indeed 
meritorious.  While, logically, I should not discount that 
possibility, it would be incredibly troubling if that were 
the case.  This would be the equivalent of a stalker — 
against whom the victim of the stalking has obtained 
an interdict to prevent the harassment — arguing that 
the fact that the victim went to the trouble of obtaining 
the interdict only serves to indicate that the victim has 
reciprocal feelings for the stalker.  Perhaps this is also the 
type of blind spot which lead to the enactment of the 
disastrous Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 28 
of 2013 (“IPLAA”).  This act seeks to give recognition to 
indigenous, or traditional, knowledge within the existing 
forms of intellectual property law.  The IPLAA is a glaring 
example of a failure to understand the structure of the 
relevant species of intellectual property law, and the 
bases for their recognition.  It smacks of a politically-
motivated sop, without regard for legal principles.  A 
draft bill of that act, version “B8B-2010,” was sent to the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) on 13 
September 2011 for comment.  The WIPO Secretariat 
— in a rather euphemistically-worded, diplomatic 
criticism of the Bill — indicated to the DTI that the 
proposed legislation was unworkable, and amounted 
to Procrustean attempt to force the protection of 
indigenous knowledge into the existing intellectual 
property framework.  That cautionary advice was buried, 
and the IPLAA was enacted.
In August 2017, the DTI published the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy.  In relation to the issue of copyright law, there 
appears — almost at the very end of the document — a 
cryptic note which, in effect, states that the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy will not deal with copyright law (or indigenous 
knowledge) because these legislative initiatives have 
already “commenced or been concluded prior to the 
formulation of the IP Policy.”20 
20 2017 Draft IP Policy 36.
There is no indication that the legislation which has 
been passed, such as, the IPLAA, or the 2017 Copyright 
Amendment Bill are consistent with the policy as set out 
in the 2017 Draft IP Policy.  It is submitted that this was 
probably done deliberately.  As already indicated, there 
appears to be a failure to apply a proper set of principles 
by the DTI in relation to intellectual property law.
By this time, it should come as no surprise that, given 
previous experience in relation to draft legislation and 
other policy documents issued by the DTI,  the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy is, again, not an exemplary draft document.  For 
example, as a document which should have been drafted 
with the assistance of legal experts, it falls short of the 
standard required of a decent undergraduate written 
assignment.  It makes sweeping statements to support 
an argument, with hardly any references to the source 
material to substantiate those statements.  It mentions 
a study by a “leading South African university” which 
apparently “found that a significant number of patents 
granted in South Africa would not pass muster under 
an examining system.”21 It also states that there are 
“major drawbacks” concerning our depository system 
of patenting, which has been the subject of “numerous 
studies.”22  There is no further information concerning 
the particular studies or any references to any documents 
which the reader could consult to verify the basis for 
the statements, or examine the quality of the relevant 
underlying research which is being cited in support of 
the particular contentions.  Further on, the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy claims that the economic literature “reveals an 
inconclusive link between increased IP protection and 
economic development”.23  There are no references to 
any of the literature which either support a strong link 
between strong intellectual protection and economic 
development, or which may challenge that position.  
It is perhaps because of this lack of proper support 
and coherence that the 2017 Draft IP Policy has to 
resort to the type of language which is more reminiscent 
of matters which are to be accepted as articles of faith, 
rather than make a case on the basis of cogent, evidence-
based arguments.  Indeed, we are required to “verily” 
accept that our domestic context is so materially 
different as to depart from the laws which may exist 
elsewhere.24   
21 2017 Draft IP Policy 7.
22 2017 Draft IP Policy 15.
23 2017 Draft IP Policy 8.
24 2017 Draft IP Policy 8.
8If this is the type of “evidence-based South African 
perspective” upon which we are to build our intellectual 
property law, as suggested in the 2017 Draft IP Policy, 
it does not bode well for the future.25 When a policy 
document utilises unsubstantiated claims it leaves one 
with a distinct concern that it is not the product of a 
deliberative, evidence-based exercise, but is simply meant 
to provide a veneer of formal validity, or justification, 
to implement a particular course of action for political 
convenience.
As already alluded to, the focus of the 2017 Draft IP 
Policy appears to be our current patent system.  More 
specifically, the reason for the patent system being the 
focus of immediate legislative attention is the contention 
that it is an obstacle to public health.26 Currently, South 
Africa has a so-called “depository system” in relation to 
patent applications.  This means that patent applications 
are not substantively examined to determine if the 
requirements are satisfied, namely, that the subject 
matter of the patent is a “new invention which involves 
an inventive step and which is capable of being used or 
applied in trade or industry or agriculture.”27  The validity 
of a patent is only substantively assessed if its validity 
is disputed in patent-infringement proceedings, or in 
revocation proceedings. 28  Patent applications are simply 
assessed for compliance with the formal requirements. 
In contrast, in the other major jurisdictions, such as, the 
US and Europe, patent applications undergo substantive 
examination before they are granted.29  
The primary reason why we do not subject 
patent applications to substantive examination is as 
a consequence of the lack of capacity to operate an 
effective system of substantive examination.  We simply 
do not have enough people with the required technical 
expertise to operate such a system.  This reality is — 
to some extent — acknowledged in the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy.30 To put the scale of the problem in context, 
according to a recent enquiry at the South African 
Institute of Intellectual Property Law, there are currently, 
in total, approximately 124 registered patent attorneys 
in South Africa.  In contrast, during a visit to the German 
Patent Office, I was informed that, on its own, it has 
approximately 800 patent examiners.
25 2017 Draft IP Policy 32.
26 2017 Draft IP Policy 6.
27 Section 25(1) Patents Act 57 of 1978 (“Patents Act”).
28 Section 61.
29 Dean O H and Dyer A Dean & Dyer: Introduction to Intellectual 
Property Law (2014) 1ed 258.
30 2017 Draft IP Policy 5.
The 2017 Draft IP Policy suggests that a “substantial 
part of the problem” in relation to public health is as 
a consequence of the fact that South Africa does not 
conduct substantive examination of patents.31  While it 
is not suggested, as a matter of fact, that a depositary 
system may not present an opportunity for abuse of the 
patent system, the 2017 Draft IP Policy does not present 
convincing evidence for the contention that there is 
a substantial problem.  On the contrary, there may be 
good reasons why the problem may not be as significant 
as it is claimed to be.  Again, the following counter 
arguments are not stated as matters of fact, but these are 
possibilities which a well-researched policy document 
should have considered.  There is no suggestion of that 
having been the case. 
First, the 2017 Draft IP Policy seeks to support its 
argument by relying on a study which indicates that South 
Africa grants patents at a much higher rate than other 
countries.32 That fact on its own does not suggest that 
there is a systemic problem with the depositary system, 
or, more specifically, with pharmaceutical patenting.  In 
comparison to countries such as the US, Europe, India 
and Brazil, the number of applications in South Africa 
is hardly significant.33 Furthermore, most of the South 
African patent applications are foreign applications, that 
is, the first filing for the patent was in a country other 
than South Africa.  This may be suggestive of two facts: 
that the South African market is generally not considered 
to be commercially significant enough to bother with 
seeking patent protection in respect of patents which 
have been filed elsewhere; and, therefore, that only patent 
applications with real prospects of success elsewhere 
(or those that are really valuable) are also sort to be 
protected in South Africa. 
Second, there is the possibility that the patent 
profession, mindful of the fact that South Africa has a 
depository system, has to ensure that it conducts a more 
rigorous exercise in ensuring substantive compliance, 
because their clients will look to them for having failed 
to ensure that their inventions receive the required legal 
protection, rather than them being able to deflect blame 
due to an added level of substantive scrutiny by a patent 
examiner. Moreover, in the case of patents emanating 
from South Africa, it is highly unlikely that an inventor 
would only seek to patent an invention in South Africa. 
31 2017 Draft IP Policy 6.
32 2017 Draft IP Policy 6.  The depositary system applied in South Africa 
was not the focus of the study, which mentioned the South African 
system for comparative purposes.
33 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/ (accessed 
29 August 2017).  
9Given the limited size of the South African market, an 
inventor would want to ensure that its product is also 
protected by patent law in the other major markets, such 
as, the US, Europe and Asia.  In other words, patents which 
have been filed in South Africa may proportionately be 
of a much higher quality, despite South Africa having a 
depository system.  Thus, there may be a selection bias 
for the filing of good patents applications in South Africa, 
which may account for the significantly higher success 
rate of patent applications.
Third, it is important not to overstate the benefit 
of having a substantive-examination system.  Substantive 
examination is not a guarantee that granted patents 
are valid.  While a substantive-examination system 
will provide an additional level of scrutiny to patent 
applications, a patent granted under such a system remains 
open to challenge, particularly in patent-infringement 
proceedings.  This is most certainly the case with our 
depository system.  Rather inexplicably, the proposals in 
the 2017 Draft IP Policy — which targets the alleged 
poor quality of the patents being granted in South Africa 
— actually threaten to considerably dilute the ability to 
challenge the validity of a patent which has been granted! 
While its intentions in relation to post-grant opposition 
procedures are as clear as mud, it proposes, as an interim 
measure — while it finalises those opposition procedures 
— that all oppositions to the grant of a patent should 
“proceed by way of administrative review in accordance 
with the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).”34 Administrative review 
proceedings are very limited forms of legal oversight: 
they have to be brought within the strict time limits 
prescribed, and are concerned with the reasonableness 
of decisions, not the correctness of those decisions. 
Thus, an administrative review is, strictly speaking, not 
able to resolve the issue of whether a patent should be 
been granted on the substantive basis of patent law.  I 
am afraid that you would struggle to find many worse 
examples of proposed legal reform than this cack-handed 
proposal.  This, once again, displays the concerns which 
I have concerning the level of legal expertise employed 
by the DTI when formulating proposals.  If there really 
is a substantial problem with our depository system, the 
proposal will exacerbate the problem, and not provide a 
solution to it.
Fourth, perhaps most significantly, if the 2017 Draft 
IP Policy is correct about the fact that the South African 
patents register is clogged with invalid patents, it begs 
the question as to why we have not seen a significant 
number of litigation cases involving issues of patent 
validity as a consequence.  
34 2017 Draft IP Policy 17.
The pharmaceutical market is a highly competitive 
market.  It is, arguably, competition which has yielded 
us the levels of innovation in pharmaceuticals.  In fact, 
to date, there has been no indication of an alternative 
system which is likely to produce equivalent results.35 
If a competitor is excluded from a potentially lucrative 
market (because a particular medicine is sold at inflated 
prices, well beyond its economic value) due to a patent 
of questionable validity, what do we expect would 
happen?  Unless the pharmaceutical industry as a whole 
constitutes a cartel (or some other form of cabal), a 
rational competitor would make an assessment of its 
chances of success in any potential patent-infringement 
litigation, and, based on those findings, possibly enter the 
relevant market as a competitor.  Not to do so would 
be the equivalent of leaving money on the table for a 
rival firm with an invalid patent.  There is no suggestion 
that the levels of patent litigation are high in South Africa. 
Moreover, the fraudulent assertion of patent rights may 
also amount to a contravention of competition law, if it 
amounts to an abuse of dominance on the part of the 
firm which asserts those rights.36
The 2017 Draft IP Policy does not address any of these 
issues, and does not provide a convincing case that our 
depository system is as problematic as it is claimed to be. 
It is necessary to hasten to add that I am not insensitive 
or unsympathetic to the significant issues concerning 
public health in South Africa.  I am not even suggesting 
that there are no issues concerning intellectual property 
law in this environment.  What I am not prepared to do is 
simply accept superficial, and uninformed, rhetoric as the 
basis for decision-making.  For purposes of argument, let 
us assume that the economic literature is inconclusive 
about the importance of strong intellectual property 
law to a knowledge-driven economy, the rational 
course of action would not be to go for broke and 
dilute, or expropriate, the property rights afforded by 
intellectual property law.  One would expect a cautious, 
prudent approach to such matters, and not plunging 
in with headlong haste, or reckless disregard for the 
economic consequences.  There is a real danger that the 
proposals in relation to the substantive examination of 
pharmaceutical patents will cause the patenting system 
to grind to a halt, which could do untold damage to our 
reputation in relation to the protection of intellectual 
property.  What we could provide for is a group within 
DTI whose function it is to investigate pharmaceutical 
patents, and, if any patents are found to be invalid, that 
group could institute revocation proceedings.
35 McMillan 31.
36 van der Merwe A, et al. Law of Intellectual Property Law in South 
Africa 2ed (2016) 537-8.
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The DTI’s management of intellectual property 
exhibits a schizophrenic approach towards its protection. 
On the one hand, it appears to be prepared to erode the 
rights of rights holders, such as copyright owners, while, 
on the other hand, it seeks to cram additional matter 
into the existing framework of protection, which does 
not rightly belong there.  Again, the tenor of the 2017 
Draft IP Policy is not bolster patent rights, but, instead, it 
is sceptical of their appropriateness.  The Zeitgeist at DTI 
appears to be that intellectual property protection, if not 
unwarranted, is an obstacle to government achieving its 
objectives; intellectual property should, ideally, be freely 
available for others to use. In contrast, government 
imposes an obligation on a recipient of state funding to 
secure the relevant intellectual property rights which 
may have been created using publicly-funded research 
for purposes of commercialisation.37  The default position 
is not that such intellectual property should simply be 
donated to the public domain for the benefit of society.  In 
fact, if the recipient wishes to place intellectual property 
in the public domain, it must go through a bureaucratic 
process in order to obtain the necessary consent to do 
so.38 Hence, DTI’s current position is not only internally 
contradictory, it also conflicts with government’s 
objective to use publicly-funded intellectual property 
as an economic driver and as a source of funding for 
educational institutions.
What makes the approach so problematic is the 
uncertainty which the legislative provisions create.  It is no 
secret that our economy has stalled, which has, arguably, 
been — in large part — the result of governmental 
action, not just in relation to intellectual property 
law.  Intellectual property, like any another product, is 
the result of the investment of resources.  We need to 
create a legal environment which allows our people 
to unlock the value of their investments, which could 
serve to spur on economic activity.  Our fiscus is already 
under pressure. Our tax revenues, due to the lack of 
economic growth, is not increasing at the rate required 
to meet the demands on the fiscus.  It is important to 
ensure that every possible source of economic growth 
is nurtured and maximised to ensure that we increase 
possible revenues to the fiscus.  Against this background, 
we just cannot afford to be cavalier about the possible 
consequences of changes to our legal institutions, such 
as intellectual property law.  We should not rush into 
potentially-disastrous experiments, undermining well-
established property rights.  
37 Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act 51 of 2008.
38 Regulations 2(4) and 2(6) Regulations made in terms section 17 of 
the Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act, 2008 Government Gazette 33433 of 2 August 2010.
In contrast, legal developments elsewhere are focused 
on ensuring that intellectual property rights are given 
the same legal treatment as corporeal assets.
We should also be very wary when politicians 
are professing to be fighting for struggling artists.  It, 
almost invariably, means that someone else — such 
as, the taxpayer — has to bear the costs of their 
largesse.  There are a number of good reasons why a 
system of copyright is, generally, considered to be 
more appropriate than a system of direct government 
funding or patronage.  One of these is that if authors are 
dependent on government funding, it will compromise 
their independence, and it could be a shortcut to 
political censorship or Comstockery.39   I am sure that 
most of you will remember the SABC’s decision (under 
the management of Hlaudi Motsoeneng) to increase 
the local music content on its platforms to 90%, and its 
decision to increase the royalty rate paid to artists.  It 
has since been reported that that decision caused the 
SABC’s revenues to decline by more than R200 million, 
as advertisers were not prepared to spend money on 
a broadcaster that had dwindling audiences due to the 
significant changes in the content.40  Now the taxpayer 
has been asked to, once again, come to the rescue of 
the SABC.  The SABC requires a government guarantee 
of R1 billion as it “was expecting to end the 2016/17 
financial year with a net loss of R1.1bn. It recorded a 
loss of R411m in 2015/16, up from R395m the previous 
year.”41 
CURRENT RESEARCH
At present, there is not a sufficient recognition, or appreciation, of intellectual property rights as being 
assets on a similar footing to other property, which is 
of a tangible nature.  In particular, there is an insufficient 
appreciation for the use of intellectual property as a 
form of real security for financing purposes.  Greater 
recognition of intellectual property rights as assets 
comparable to tangible assets could allow firms, 
particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises, to 
access much-needed financing.  Accordingly, one of my 
current research projects concerns the legal framework 
within which intellectual property rights can serve as 
real security for financing transactions. 
39 Tyerman B “The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for 
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer” 1974 Copyright L Symp 
21 1 23.
40 Babalo Ndenze, “SABC Bleeding as Hlaudi’s 90% Local Content Policy 
Costs Dearly and Audience Goes AWOL” Sunday World, 10 May 2017, 
http://www.sundayworld.co.za/news/2017/05/10/sabc-bleeding-as-
hlaudis-90-local-content-policy-costs-dearly-and-audience-goes-awol 
(accessed 22 August 2017). 
41 Bekezela Phakathi and Linda Ensor, “Treasury still mulling over 
SABC request”, Business Day, 22 August 2017, http://businessday.
newspaperdirect.com/epaper/showarticle.aspx?article=7fbca46a-
a23c-4c75-ae1f-c2e4c2003634&key=JzEHlFhiDY0eqZujfx1U8w%3d%3
d&issue=11062017082200000000001001 (accessed 22 August 2017).
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To illustrate the potential value which intellectual 
property rights can represent, consider the COCA-
COLA trade mark.  Until recently, it was considered to 
be the most valuable brand in the world.42 If, due to 
some catastrophic event, the Coca-Cola company were 
to lose all its bottling plants, inventory, vehicles and 
immovable property, there would be no doubt that its 
trade mark (and associated brand) would still be worth 
a considerable amount of money.  The company should 
be able to unlock that value by offering its trade mark 
as a form of real security in order to access financing to 
restart its business operations.  Similarly, the copyright 
owner of the works of the author JK Rowling, no doubt, 
receives a considerable stream of income from the sales 
generated from her novels.  The copyright owner should 
be able to offer the copyright in those works as real 
security (along with the associated income stream) to 
a bank to access a lumpsum amount for its business 
purposes.  However, there is no uniform, clear, and cheap 
manner in which intellectual property rights can be 
offered as real security in South Africa.
In South African law, personal security and real 
security serve as important devices in the extension 
of financial credit.  Both forms of security secure a 
creditor’s claim should a debtor become insolvent.43  In 
the case of personal security, a person other that the 
debtor undertakes liability on the debtor’s behalf, should 
the debtor default in its obligations to the creditor. 
In the case of real security, property belonging to the 
debtor (or another party) is encumbered in order to 
satisfy the creditor’s claim in the event of the debtor’s 
default.44  While the legislation dealing with certain types 
of intellectual property (more specifically, trade marks, 
patents and designs) make express provision for those 
rights to be offered as a form of real security, those 
provisions may not exclusively determine the means by 
which such rights could be provided as real security.  In 
contrast, in respect of other intellectual property,  namely, 
copyright and plant breeders’ rights, it is necessary to 
rely on possible alternative methods by which intellectual 
property rights could serve as a form of real security.  In 
particular, there is the possibility that real security may 
be obtained by way of a security cession (or cession in 
securitatem debiti) of the relevant intellectual property 
rights (in terms of the common law),45 
42 http://interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/2013/Best-Global-
Brands-2013-Brand-View.aspx (28 August 2014).
43 Lubbe G F “Mortgage and Pledge” in Joubert W and Kuhne M Law of 
South Africa (2008) para 324.
44 in para 324.  For purposes of this work, it will be assumed that the 
real security is being provided by the debtor.
45 In the case of a non-possessory pledge (such as a security cession), 
the property will have to be secured via an attachment (or perfection) 
order (see Brits R Real Security Law 1ed (2016) 159).  
or — to a very limited extent — the registration of a 
notarial bond over the relevant intellectual property 
rights.46
Depending on the nature of the property — 
immovable or movable — different forms of real security 
are available.  Immovable property can be encumbered by 
way of a registered mortgage bond.47  Movable property 
can serve as security either by being pledged, whereby 
the asset is delivered to the creditor,48 or by registering a 
notarial bond over the asset.49  Thus, whether intellectual 
property rights, as intangible property, is of an immovable 
or movable nature will — in the absence of statutory 
measures providing a mechanism for the creation of a 
security right (or providing clarity on the category of 
property) — be decisive of the category of real security 
applicable to those rights.  At present, there is no straight-
forward answer as to the whether a particular form of 
intellectual property is of an immovable or movable 
nature.  This issue is critical to whether intellectual 
property for which there is no express statutory 
provision concerning the creation of a real right of 
security, namely, copyright and plant breeders’ rights. 
Even in relation to those forms of intellectual property 
for which there are express statutory provisions, it is still 
important to know whether they could also be offered 
as a form of real security by way of a security cession 
or the registration of a notarial bond over the relevant 
rights.
Except for copyright, the relevant legislation does 
not expressly indicate whether trade marks, patents, 
designs or plant breeders’ rights are of an immovable or 
movable nature.50  
46 It should be noted that these possible alternative methods of security 
may also be used in relation to intellectual property in respect of which 
express provision has been made for those rights to be offered as a 
form of real security.  The bondholder of a general notarial bond does 
not obtain a real-security right as such.  It only has a real-security right 
(that is, becomes a secured creditor) when it has obtained physical 
control over the property which is the subject of the bond (that is, 
upon perfection) (see Brits 198, 202 and 206).  Similarly, a special 
notarial bond over intellectual property rights will not provide a right 
of real security to the bondholder.  The bondholder only obtains a real-
security right on perfection of the bond (see 239, 240 and 262).
47 Lubbe para 327.
48 in para 406.
49 in para 399; Brits  197 – 198. A distinction can be made between a 
general and special notarial bond – a general notarial bond is registered 
against all the debtor’s movable assets, while a special notarial bond is 
limited to only certain movable assets.
50 The Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (“Trade Marks Act”); Designs Act 
195 of 1993; Patents Act; and Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 do 
not specify the nature of the relevant species of intellectual property. 
However, section 22(5) Copyright Act states that copyright shall be 
transmissible as moveable property.
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The statutory provision relating to the hypothecation of 
trade marks state that it will have the same effect as a 
pledge, which implies that trade marks are regarded as 
movable property.51 In the case of patents and designs, 
the respective acts do not indicate what the nature of 
the real-security right is.  It is submitted that, reasoning by 
way of analogy to the position of the statutory provisions 
relating to the hypothecation of registered trade marks, 
the nature of the security interest is also in the nature 
of a pledge.  Accordingly, patents and designs are also, 
by extension,  property of a movable nature.  However, 
despite the express statutory provision concerning 
the nature of copyright, in the context of determining 
whether a South African court had jurisdiction to decide 
matters relating to a foreign copyright infringement 
claim, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that intellectual 
property rights, including copyright, are immovable 
incorporeals.52 If the aforementioned judgment is 
not construed restrictively (or shown to have been 
incorrect), it potentially presents a huge problem for the 
possible creation of a right of real security over copyright 
(and plant breeders’ rights) in the manner indicated, as 
there is no statutory provision concerning the creation 
of a right of real security.
While the commercial imperative to create a right 
of real security over copyright has led to the use of a 
security cession, doctrinally this approach is not without 
its problems.  There has, however, been no direct 
engagement with the security cession of intellectual 
property rights, such as copyright.  It has, however, been 
accepted (without any specific elaboration) that, under 
South African law, rights to incorporeals or personal 
rights (or claims), which are capable of transmission by 
mere agreement, are transferred by way of cession.53 
The requirement that the rights in question must be 
transferable by “mere agreement” is said to simply mean 
that there should be no additional required dispositive 
act, such as the requirement to effect delivery, as is the 
case with movable property, which distinguishes these 
respective forms of transfer.  Accordingly, it is stated that 
intellectual property rights are incorporeals and should, 
prima facie, be transferable by way of cession.54   
51 Section 41(4) Trade Marks Act.
52 Gallo Africa Ltd & Others v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd & Others 2010 (6) SA 
329 (SCA) [19] and [24].
53 Lubbe G F “Cession” in Joubert W and Kuhne M Law of South Africa 
(2013) para 129, 131 and 147; Scott S The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 7 
and 11; Scott S Cession for Students 2ed (2013) 7 and 9.
54 Lubbe “Cession”para 134 and 152.
However, Susan Scott suggested that cession should — 
strictly speaking — be confined to the transfer of personal 
rights arising from the law of obligations (namely, the 
right to claim a particular performance), and not other 
incorporeals.55 She suggested that its use in relation to 
other incorporeals — which would include intellectual 
property rights, such as, copyright — is simply a synonym 
for “transfer.”56 Unlike the other types of legal rights — 
which have an identifiable object — personal rights are 
concerned with a claim against a specific person.57  A 
fact which seems to support Scott’s contention is the 
fact that copyright is stated as being transferred by way 
of assignment, and not cession.58 Of course, we have 
seen our courts adopting a very pragmatic approach to 
security cessions of personal rights — in particular, the 
pledge construction given to it — despite its doctrinal 
difficulties. 59 
Another problem in relation to copyright is that it 
an unregistered form of intellectual property.  The only 
exception to this being the register of copyright in 
cinematograph films established under the Registration 
of Copyright in Cinematograph Films Act 62 of 1977. 60 
In addition to the provision of an express statutory right 
to create a right of real security, it would be desirable 
for there to be a register of rights of real security over 
copyright.  However, we should be moving away from 
the usual paper-based approaches to registers of this 
nature.  What I mean by that is that while some of these 
registers are now, of course digitised, they are in essence, 
still paper-based systems. Consideration should seriously 
be given to the use of blockchain technology for the 
creation of new registers.  These types of registers could 
provide for a more resilient and transparent system, and 
could facilitate a market in the underlying assets.
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, it should 
be clear that further work is required in relation to 
the creation of rights of real security over intellectual 
property rights.
55 Scott The Law of Cession 11 and 21.
56 21.
57 21-2.
58 Section 22(1) Copyright Act.
59 Brits 280-1.
60 It is not compulsory for cinematograph films to be registered for 
copyright protection to subsist in such works, and registration simply 
facilitates the enforcement proceedings in relation to cinematograph 
films.  See Dean O and Karjiker S Handbook of South African Copyright 
Law (2015) para 15.2.
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Another area of research which has not received any 
significant attention in South Africa is that of the interface 
between competition law and intellectual property 
law.  This fact has also been noted in the 2017 Draft IP 
Policy.61  The Chair recognised the need for research in 
this interface for some time now, and has incorporated 
an optional module in competition law as part of its LLM 
in intellectual property law.  From 2018 we should see 
the first students who may take the elective module in 
competition law, which should encourage research at the 
interface.
CONCLUSION
The real cause of many of the problems we have in South Africa is not intellectual property law or 
property law, or the alleged failure to de-colonise our 
education system.  It is poverty, and a government which 
has failed to fulfil the promises it made.  There is no doubt 
that economically prosperous countries have fewer of 
the socio-economic challenges with which we are faced 
with in South Africa, particularly health care.  Our focus 
should be on building a legal system which stimulates 
economic growth, rather than us adopting the perennial 
role as victims of the exploitative conduct of others.
61 2017 Draft IP Policy 25.
